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Agglomeration is a location pattern frequently observed in service industries such as hotels. This paper
empirically examines if agglomeration facilitates tacit collusion in the lodging industry using a quarterly
dataset of hotels that operated in rural areas across Texas between 2003 and 2005. We jointly model
a price and occupancy rate equation under a switching regression model to endogenously identify
a collusive and non-collusive regime. The estimation results indicate that clustered hotels have a higher
probability of being in the potential collusive regime than isolated properties in the same town. The
identification of a collusive regime is also consistent with other factors considered to affect the sustainability
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Agglomeration is a location pattern frequently observed in service industries such as the 
lodging industry. A common assumption is that hotels locate close to one another to 
enjoy of agglomeration effects. Fischer and Harrington (1996), for example, indicate that 
in industries where products are heterogeneous and need personal inspection, 
agglomeration results in a heightened demand. By spatially concentrating, sellers reduce 
consumer’s search costs and attract more customers as a group relative to what they could 
all attract individually.
1 Helsley and Strange (1990) add that when firms are clustered, 
they help consumers to better evaluate their options. In the case of the lodging industry, 
Chung and Kalnins (2001) argue that agglomeration effects should be higher among 
hotels located in rural areas since most of them are overnight destinations in between 
days of travel, so a cluster of hotels may signal safety in an isolated area and/or indicate 
the availability of additional services. Other studies that have analyzed agglomeration 
effects in the hotel industry include Baum and Haveman (1997) and Kalnins and Chung 
(2004). However, not much has been said about the possibility that agglomeration may 
also facilitate the coordination of prices and quantities among hotels located next to each 
other. There is more anecdotal than empirical evidence on this matter.
2
  This paper seeks to empirically examine if agglomeration facilitates tacit 
collusion in the hotel industry. As revealed by Kalnins (2006), the exchange of price and 
occupancy information among hotels appears to be very common in the industry (e.g. 
                                                 
1 See also Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983). 
2 See Kalnins (2006) for some related examples. 
  2“call-arounds”).  But agglomeration provides further opportunities for frequent firm 
interaction and can also facilitate the sustainability of a collusive agreement (if any) by 
increasing market transparency and reducing monitoring costs.
3 More specifically, on-
site inspection of rates and vacancy status is costless among clustered hotels, making it 
easier and faster to detect deviations from any potential agreement. For example, the 
number of cars in the parking lot of neighboring hotels can be easily counted or 
employees could regularly visit the lobbies of competitors to keep record of the volume 
of check-ins. We examine then whether agglomeration facilitates a collusive price and 
quantity setting. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to formally test this 
hypothesis. 
The data used for the analysis is a quarterly data set of lodging properties that 
operated in Non Metropolitan Statistical Areas (Non MSA) across Texas between 2003 
and 2005. Using the physical address of each lodging property in the data set, we are able 
to determine whether a hotel is clustered and the number of nearby competitors faced by 
each hotel within each town. Working with geographically isolated areas also enables us 
to avoid any market overlapping issues and correctly identify the total number of 
competitors within each market, as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Mazzeo (2002). 
The novelty of our methodology is that we jointly model a price and occupancy 
rate equation using a switching regression model to endogenously identify a collusive and 
non-collusive regime. In the potential collusive regime, prices are expected to be higher 
and quantities (occupancy rates) to be lower, as predicted by general oligopoly models 
                                                 
3 Our interviews with some hotel managers actually confirmed that hotels located close to one another 
exchange information on a regularly basis and adjust their rates accordingly. 
  3where firms interact repeatedly and find it profitable to cooperate under the threat of 
future punishment.
4 Additionally, prices (and occupancy rates) are expected to exhibit a 
lower dispersion during successfully collusive periods.
5 We then analyze if 
agglomeration increases the probability of being in the potential collusive regime.  
Other studies that use some form of mixture modeling to endogenously identify 
collusive and non-collusive regimes include Porter (1983), Ellison (1994) and Knittel and 
Stango (2003). But these studies basically focus on the pricing behavior of firms. Porter 
(1983) estimates a switching regression model to classify prices into collusive and non-
collusive regimes during the Joint Executive Committee cartel on railroads in the late 
19th century; Ellison (1994) reexamines the experience of the railroad cartel using a 
Markov structure on the transitions between collusive and non-collusive periods; Knittel 
and Stango (2003) use a mixture density model to test whether nonbinding price ceilings 
may serve as focal points for tacit collusion in the credit card market. Further, we 
examine if our identification strategy is consistent with other factors thought to affect the 
sustainability of colluding, as in Knittel and Stango (2003). In particular, the probability 
of engaging into tacit collusion is allowed to vary with cluster size, seasonality and firm 
size.  
The estimation results suggest that agglomeration facilitates tacit collusion. 
Clustered hotels show a higher probability of being in the suspected collusive regime 
than isolated properties in the same town. Further, our identification of a collusive regime 
                                                 
4 See Tirole (1988). 
5 Recent studies suggesting that prices are more stable under collusion include Athey, Bagwell and 
Sanchirico (2004), Connor (2005) and Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006). For a general discussion on different 
behavioral patterns under collusion, refer to Harrington (2005).  
  4is also consistent with other factors considered to affect the sustainability of colluding, 
and the results are robust to alternative cluster definitions. Moreover, hotels without any 
competitors in a town (i.e. monopolists), whom behavior is similar to perfect collusion, 
also show a higher likelihood of being in the collusive regime. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 further discusses 
how agglomeration can facilitate tacit collusion. Section 3 describes the data and certain 
empirical regularities of the lodging industry in rural areas across Texas. The empirical 
model is presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports the estimation results while Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2 Agglomeration and tacit collusion 
 
This section briefly discusses the economics of tacit collusion and how agglomeration 
can facilitate the sustainability of a cooperative agreement among clustered firms. It is 
well established that tacit collusion can arise when firms interact repeatedly in the same 
market. Firms can achieve higher profits by tacitly agreeing to raise prices (and restrict 
quantity) above (below) the static Nash equilibrium level. Since cheating or deviating 
from the collusive agreement increases current profits, firms can only be deterred from 
deviating if they are penalized in the future. For example, if a firm deviates from the 
collusive or cooperative outcome at a particular time period, the other firms may respond 
by reverting to the non-cooperative outcome for a certain number of subsequent periods 
(or forever). The collusive equilibrium condition or incentive compatibility (IC) 
  5constraint requires then that the present value of foregone future profits is greater than or 
equal to the current profits from deviating. 
 Consider  N firms each producing a differentiated product and competing in prices 
in an infinitely repeated game. All firms share the same unit cost of production. Let 
, be the price that maximizes firm i’s profits ( ) in the static version of 
the game. If firms agree to cooperate by charging  and obtaining profits   in 
each period, then the IC constraint requires that, 
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where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ δ  is the discount factor equal across firms,   are firm i’s profits when 
deviating from the collusive agreement and choosing best-response price   given all 
other firms’ prices  , and T are the number of periods of reversion to the non-collusive 
outcome. Note that  . From the condition above, it follows that the collusive 
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To see how agglomeration can facilitate collusion, assume that firms compete f 
times in a given time period. The discount factor can then be defined as 
f r / 1
1
+
= δ , 
where r is the interest rate in a given period (Cabral, 2000). Since clustered hotels are 
likely to interact more frequently than isolated properties and δ  is increasing in the 
frequency of interaction among firms, it is clear that agglomeration can facilitate the 
  6sustainability of a collusive agreement.
6 Intuitively, when firms interact more often, they 
can react more quickly if one of the firms deviates from the agreement, so collusion is 
easier to maintain. A similar idea applies if we consider that clustered hotels adjust their 
prices more frequently than isolated ones.  
Additionally, agglomeration increases the transparency of the market and reduces 
monitoring costs. On-site inspections of both rates and vacancy status (parking lots) are 
costless among clustered hotels, making it easier and faster to detect deviations from any 
agreement. This, in turn, limits the potential profits from deviating or short term profits 
, making collusion more easier to sustain among hotels in a cluster.
d
i π
7   
                                                 
6 Alternatively, we can let T= ∞ and assume that firms only compete every k periods, so the higher the 
frequency of interaction among firms the lower the value of k. It can be shown then that the critical 
threshold for the weight firms put on their future profits, i.e. the value of δ that makes equation (1) hold 
with equality, decreases with a lower k (Ivaldi et al., 2003). 
7 It is worth to mention that the discussion above (and the posterior empirical analysis) on how 
agglomeration may facilitate tacit collusion takes geographic location as given. Friedman and Thisse 
(1991) have also shown that agglomeration is the only equilibrium outcome when collusion on price 
follows competition on location. Locating at the same point implies that firms’ ability to punish one another 
for defection is maximized once the equilibrium locations are selected. The authors develop a spatial 
duopoly model in which firms simultaneously select their locations at the beginning of time (once and 
forever) and choose prices in each of a countable infinite succession of time periods. The critical 
assumption in their model is that firms have the ability, at the beginning of the game, to determine the set 
of price outcomes that are admissible in the subsequent repeated subgames. The authors also briefly discuss 
some model extensions. In particular, they argue that when location is chosen sequentially and collusion on 
prices takes place after entry, the second firm will locate at the same place as the first one, eliminating any 
first-mover advantage observed in the one-shot price game. But if location is chosen simultaneously and 
  7As noted, in the analysis we also control for factors, other than agglomeration, 
that can affect the sustainability of collusion.
8 These other factors include number of 
competitors (cluster size), seasonality and firm size. We discuss later how these other 
variables can make a collusive agreement easier or more difficult to sustain. Next, we 
describe the data used for the study and some empirical regularities of the hotel industry 




The main data source of this paper is the Texas Hotel Performance Factbook, published 
every quarter by Source Strategies Inc.. This is a unique data set that contains information 
on room counts, average daily rates (ADR), and occupancy rates for all lodging 
properties in Texas exceeding 18,000 dollars per quarter in gross revenues.
9 The data set 
also provides the hotel name and address, and indicates whether each property is 
                                                                                                                                                 
there are more than two firms, they sustain that firms’ location will be affected by collusive pricing 
although it is not obvious that all firms will choose to locate together. 
8 For an extensive description of factors relevant for collusion see Ivaldi et al. (2003). 
9 See Table A.1 for a more detailed description of these variables. According to SSI, properties below 
18,000 dollars per quarter result in approximately 1.5% of the total state revenues being excluded from this 
database. To our knowledge, this is one of the few datasets that provide detailed financial information of 
each lodging property in a whole state. Smith Travel Research (STR), a leading private research firm in the 
lodging industry, gets full financial reports from hotels/motels accounting for 80% of the market but only 
publishes aggregate results. They also maintain a Lodging Census Database which does not include 
financial information.   
  8affiliated to a “Top 50+” chain.
10 Hotels are ordered by MSA/Non MSA, city/town and 
zip code. In this study, we focus on lodging properties that operated in Non MSA across 
the state between 2003 and 2005. This allows us to work with a comparable and 
geographically isolated set of oligopoly markets. Similar to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) 
and Mazzeo (2002), by working with isolated markets we avoid any inter-market 
competition issues and correctly identify the number of competitors on each market.
11 
Overall, we have an unbalanced panel of 9,148 observations corresponding to 845 
properties operating in 250 markets between the first quarter of 2003 and the fourth 
quarter of 2005.
12   
The data set was supplemented with quality ratings from the American 
Automobile Association’s (AAA) online hotel directory (www.aaa-texas.com). In this 
directory, lodging properties are rated from one to five “diamonds”, ranging from simple 
to luxurious.
13 Following Mazzeo (2002), for those “Top 50+” chain-affiliated hotels not 
listed in the directory, we assigned the modal category of other chain-affiliated members 
that were in fact rated. Since AAA has minimum quality standards for inclusion of hotels 
                                                 
10 The “Top 50+” chains are determined and tracked by Source Strategies Inc., and may vary across time. 
11 Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) study the relationship between the number of firms, market size and 
competition using a sample of 202 isolated local markets (county seats) in the western United States. 
Mazzeo (2002), in turn, analyzes the effect of market concentration and product differentiation on market 
outcomes using a cross section of 492 isolated motel markets located adjacent to small, rural exits along 
one of the 30 longest U.S. interstate highways.   
12 The unbalanced panel results from the fact that the information for certain hotels and markets is not fully 
reported by SSI across all periods, and due to a small number of entries/exits in some markets.  
13 Refer to Table A.2 for details of AAA Diamond rating. Hotels range from 1 to 4 diamonds in our sample. 
  9in their directory, we assigned the lowest category for independent properties and other 
minor chains not listed. These ratings allow us to control for quality in the estimations.  
The data set was finally complemented with several control variables to account 
for different cost and demand conditions across markets. These variables include 
population, per capita personal income, number of gas stations at each location, value of 
rural land per acre, weekly wage on leisure and hospitality, distance to a MSA and 
regional dummies.
14 Table A.3 describes the sources of information consulted to 
construct these variables.  
 
3.1 The Lodging Industry in Non MSA across Texas 
 
The total number of properties in Non MSA across the state increased at an annual 
growth rate of 2.9% between 1995 and 2005, totaling 790 hotels and motels by the end of 
2005.
15 The continuous upward trend in the supply of lodging units is reflected in the 
increase of room nights available, as shown in Figure 1. The number of rooms sold and, 
consequently, the occupancy rate did not follow a similar pattern. The latter showed a 
downward trend at the beginning of the present decade probably due to the recession of 
the economy and the 9/11 events, but recovered recently. The average occupancy rate in 
                                                 
14 Distance to a MSA is measured as the mileage between the town and the nearest MSA.  
15 In the same time period, lodging properties in MSA report an annual growth rate of 4.7%, totaling 3,194 
hotels by the end 2005.  
  102005 was around 52%, similar to the levels shown in the late 90’s.
16 The total room 
revenues, on the contrary, showed a steady increase (explained in part by the increase in 
the ADR), reaching almost 200 million dollars in 2005. The ADR increased two dollars 
in real terms, or sixteen dollars in nominal terms, across the period.   
As noted, we focus on the period 2003-2005.
17 The whole list of locations in our 
sample, by region, is reported in Table A.4. Our unit of observation is a hotel-quarter 
pair. Table 1 presents the distribution of markets by number of operating firms at each 
point in time.
18 It follows that our sample basically consists of small oligopolies. In four 
of every five markets observed, there are five or less hotels operating. More specifically, 
37% of the markets are monopolies, 18% are duopolies and another 26% have between 
three and five competitors.  
Table 2 indicates that more than 68% of the operating properties do not have more 
than 50 rooms and an additional 20% have between 51 and 75 rooms. The small capacity 
of these properties is consistent with the small size of the markets in our sample. In terms 
of the distribution of hotels by chain affiliation and quality type, Table 3 shows that 
                                                 
16 As noted by Kalnins (2006), the nationwide occupancy rate of an average hotel is roughly 60% while the 
break-even occupancy (i.e. percentage of rooms that must be sold on average for a hotel to show positive 
pretax income) is estimated at around 53% since 2000.  
17 The second semester of 2005 may be an atypical period because of the sudden increase in the demand for 
hotel rooms after Katrina and Rita. However, according to a list of hotels/motels that participated in the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) temporary housing program, provided by the same 
agency, most of the evacuees in Texas relocated in urban areas. In any case, we include time-period 
dummies in our estimates.     
18 Considering that we have data for 12 quarters, each market can be observed up to 12 times. 
  11independent hotels and small franchises remain quite common across rural areas. Two 
thirds of the properties are either independent or not affiliated to any of the “Top 50+” 
chains. Among the properties that represent a top chain, 26% are affiliated to Best 
Western, 13% to Holiday Inn Express or Holiday Inn, 12% to Days Inn, 10% to Comfort 
Inn or Comfort Suites and 10% to Super 8.  
There is a strong correlation between large franchises and quality type. Overall, 
36% of the hotels in our sample are of high-quality, i.e. are rated with two or more 
“diamonds” according to AAA, and 88% of them represent a top chain. Since both chain 
affiliation and quality type are sources of product differentiation, we account for both of 
them in the estimations as well as for hotel size.  
With respect to the geographical location of properties, relative to their nearby 
competitors, we find that 35% of them have at least one competitor in a radius of 0.2 
miles. This fraction decreases to 24% if we reduce the ratio to 0.1 miles and increases to 
52% if we extend the ratio to half a mile. Since the exact extent of a cluster is an 
empirical issue, we limit the cluster radius to 0.2 miles and compare our estimation 
results to those obtained under the other two alternative measures.
19 These conservative 
measures are also in line with the idea that for agglomeration to facilitate the 
sustainability of a collusive agreement, hotels should be located sufficiently close to each 
other to interact (and adjust prices) frequently, increase market transparency and reduce 
monitoring costs, so any potential deviation can be easily and promptly detected.  
                                                 
19 This empirical issue is similar to the problem that arises when establishing geographical boundaries to 
identify a firm’s close competitors. Netz and Taylor (2002), for example, use market radii of half a mile, 
one mile and two miles in their study about gas stations’ location patterns in Los Angeles. As indicated, we 
avoid any market definition issues because we work with rural areas which are generally isolated. 
  12In Table 4 we segment our sample of hotels into four groups: clustered hotels, 
isolated hotels with a cluster of hotels in town, monopolists (i.e. hotels without any 
competitors in town), and isolated hotels without any cluster in town. As can be seen, 
clustered hotels seem to be larger and of higher quality than the other groups of hotels. 
Monopolists, on the contrary, are much smaller and of lower quality while isolated hotels, 
with and without a cluster in town, are in between. In particular, among clustered hotels, 
43% have more than 50 rooms and almost 50% are of high quality. Among isolated 
properties with a cluster of hotels in town, 33% have more than 50 rooms and 41% are of 
high quality while among those without a cluster in town, the figures are 25% and 28%, 
respectively. Finally, only 10% of the monopolists have more than 50 rooms and 91% are 
of low quality, probably due to the fact that monopolists are basically located in small 
markets.    
For the present study, we are particularly interested in examining the price and 
occupancy rate behavior of clustered hotels relative to isolated ones in the same town. A 
preliminary look at the data reveals that clustered hotels seem to behave in a different 
manner than isolated properties. Figures 2 and 3 indicate that clustered hotels charge, on 
average, lower prices and have higher occupancy rates, regardless of the season of the 
year. Overall, the average daily rate of a room in clustered hotels is 52.8 dollars versus 
57.6 dollars in isolated hotels with a cluster in town (see Table 5). The average 
occupancy rate among clustered properties is 51.3% and 49.8% among isolated 
properties. In terms of dispersion, clustered hotels exhibit a much lower dispersion in 
prices and a slightly lower dispersion in occupancy rates across the year.  
  13This initial look at the data provides mixed support regarding the hypothesis that 
agglomeration facilitates tacit collusion. If agglomeration increases the probability of 
colluding and if there are not any deviations from the collusive agreement, we would then 
expect a lower dispersion in prices and occupancy rates among clustered properties, 
relative to isolated ones, as observed. However, we would also expect clustered hotels to 
charge higher prices than isolated hotels and exhibit lower occupancy rates, but not the 
inverse.
20  
Next, we formally examine whether agglomeration facilitates tacit collusion. We 
propose a switching regression model to endogenously classify prices and occupancy 
rates into collusive and non-collusive regimes, while controlling for several factors at the 
property and market level that may affect a firm’s competitive behavior. We then 
examine whether agglomerated hotels exhibit a higher probability of colluding than 
isolated hotels in the same town. 
  
4 The Empirical Model 
 
                                                 
20 Alternatively, the differences in prices and occupancy rates between clustered and isolated hotels in a 
town could be explained in the context of the spatial competition literature, which considers a market 
power and a market share effect when clustering (e.g. Fujita and Thisse, 1996; Pinske and Slade, 1998; and 
Netz and Taylor, 2002). The market power effect predicts that, other things equal, firms will compete more 
intensively on prices when locating closer to each other (i.e. lower prices). But if the products between 
firms are differentiated enough, price competition may be weakened (Irmen and Thisse, 1998). The market 
share effect, in turn, predicts that firms will capture more customers when clustering (i.e. higher occupancy 
rates).  
  14This section develops a switching regime model to analyze if clustered hotels are more 
likely to engage in collusive behavior than isolated properties in the same town. We 
jointly model a price and occupancy rate equation under a mixture modeling to 
endogenously identify a collusive and non-collusive regime. We then analyze if 
agglomeration increases the probability of colluding. As in Knittel and Stango (2003), we 
also test whether our identification of the collusive regime is consistent with other factors 
thought to affect the sustainability of collusion.
21   












imt u X re MktStructu q + + + = β α α 2 1 ln ,    (3) 
where the subscript i refers to a firm, m to the market, and t to the time period, and the 
superscript s indicates one of two possible regimes, a collusive regime (C) and a non-
collusive one (NC). The variable MktStructuremt measures the level concentration in the 
market through the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), which is based on each firm’s 
share of rooms sold, and the vector Ximt includes several property- and market-specific 
variables. The summary statistics of all variables used in the estimations are presented in 
Table 6. 
The property-specific variables include dummy variables for the geographic 
location of hotels relative to their nearby competitors (i.e. clustered, isolated with a 
                                                 
21 These authors point out that an omitted variable or misspecification of the functional form might lead to 
the spurious identification of two regimes, a collusive and a non-collusive one. They suggest then 
examining whether the probability of being in the identified collusive regime varies with factors thought to 
affect the sustainability of collusion.  
  15cluster of hotels in town, monopolist, isolated with no cluster in town), cluster size, a 
dummy variable if the hotel is of medium or large size (i.e. if the hotel has more than 50 
rooms) and dummy variables for high-quality and affiliations to major chains in our 
sample.
22 The market-specific variables include population, per capita personal income, 
number of gas stations, value of rural land per acre, wage on leisure and hospitality, 
distance to a MSA and regional dummies. These firm- and market-specific variables are 
intended to account for cost and demand factors that may affect a firm’s competitive 
behavior, besides market concentration.  
  Further assume that the error terms in each regime s,  } , { NC C s = , are bivariate 
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− + =  and the mixing parameter h,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ h , is defined as 
the probability that a firm will collude.  
In the collusive regime, firms are expected to charge higher prices and exhibit 
lower occupancy rates (restrict output) than in the non-collusive regime. Additionally, 
                                                 
22 Recall that a hotel is considered of high quality if it is rated with two or more “diamonds” according to 
AAA. The major chains include Best Western, Best Value, Comfort, Days, Econolodge, Holiday, Motel 6, 
Super 8 and Ramada. 
  16during successfully collusive periods we expect a lower dispersion in prices and 
occupancy rates. Consequently, identifying a potential collusive regime requires to test if 
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The mixing parameter h or probability of engaging into tacit collusion is modeled 
as a constant and as a function of the geographical location of a hotel relative to its 
nearby competitors. In the former case,  ) (κ G h =  where κ  is a constant and   is 
approximated with a logistic CDF; in the latter case, 
) (⋅ G
) _ _ ( 4 3 2 1 j j j j cluster no Isolated Monop Clustered G h κ κ κ κ + + + =  where Clustered 
equals to one if the hotel has a nearby competitor in a radius of 0.2 miles, Monop equals 
to one if the hotel is the only one operating in the town, and Isolated_no_cluster equals to 
one if the hotel does not have a nearby competitor in a radius of 0.2 miles and there is not 
a cluster of hotels in town .
23 The first specification assumes that the probability of tacit 
collusion is constant across all hotels (and time periods) while the second specification 
allows us to evaluate whether the probability of being in a potential collusive regime 
varies with the relative location of the hotel within the town. Examining then if 
agglomeration facilitates collusion is equivalent to testing if  0 2 > κ .  
Provided that our identification strategy of a collusive and non-collusive regime 
may be subject to an omitted variable or misspecification of the functional form, we also 
model h as a function of other factors typically correlated with the sustainability of tacit 
collusion. These other factors include cluster size, seasonality and firm size. Tacit 
collusion is easier to maintain among fewer firms so the probability of being in a 
potential collusive regime should decrease with the number of firms in the cluster. 
                                                 
23 The dummy variable for isolated properties with a cluster of hotels in town is the base variable. 
  17Similarly, collusion is less likely during high season periods because the gain from 
cheating during a peak-demand period is higher than the future punishment (Rotemberg 
and Saloner, 1986).
24 Finally, the probability of colluding should also increase with firm 
size since deviations from any collusive agreement are typically more profitable for 
smaller than for larger firms.
25
In the estimation of the price and occupancy rate equations specified in (2) and 
(3), some of the right-hand side variables are likely to be endogenous. In particular, the 
market-level HHI is presumably endogenous because there might be unobserved cost or 
demand characteristics in a market that not only influence prices (and occupancy rates) 
but also the underlying market structure. For example, markets with unobserved high 
costs are likely to have higher prices but these markets are also likely to exhibit fewer 
firm entries. We instrument the HHI with the HHI of the closest urban area to the town, 
obtained also from the Texas Hotel Performance Factbook. This instrument is valid under 
the assumption that market structure of the closest city, which is also affected by 
unobserved cost or demand characteristics in the area, is not influenced by prices (or 
occupancy rates) in a particular town.  
Other potential endogenous variables include hotel size, quality type and location, 
although we treat them as predetermined. As indicated by Fernandez and Marin (1998), 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, if both current demand and firms’ expectations on future demand are allowed to change 
over time, it will be more difficult for firms to collude when demand is falling (i.e. during low seasons) 
since the foregone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low (Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991). 
25 Smaller firms, however, may also have less to gain from undercutting their rivals because of their higher 
capacity constraints relative to larger firms. But hotels in rural areas (at least in Texas) seem to operate well 
below their capacity, as previously shown. 
  18the behavior of firms in the hotel industry can be represented as a sequential process. 
Initially, firms decide if they want to open an establishment in a particular location and 
simultaneously choose their capacity and quality. So these variables could be regarded as 
long-run decision variables. Firms compete then in prices (quantities) and take the 
establishments’ capacity, quality and location as given. It is also important to note that in 
our working sample the number of entries and exits are very small, as well as the number 
of hotels that changed their affiliations (and possibly their capacity and/or quality level). 
 
5 Results  
 
We now turn to our estimation results. As noted, we instrument HHI with the HHI of the 
closest urban area to the town. Kleibergen and Paap’s (2006) LM under-identification test 
and Wald weak-identification test indicate that the market-level HHI and HHI squared of 
the closest urban area are not weakly correlated with the market-level HHI of a particular 
town in our sample.
26 Hansen’s J statistic for overidentifying restrictions also indicates 
that with a five percent level of significance we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
these instruments are valid instruments (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term in the price 
and occupancy rate equations). A semiparametric partially linear version of this first-
stage regression, where the HHI of the closest city is modeled nonparametrically and all 
other exogenous variables are modeled linearly, further increases the R-squared from 
                                                 
26 Results are available upon request. The LM and Wald versions of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk 
statistic are a generalization of the well-known Anderson LM test of canonical correlations and Cragg and 
Donald Wald test for weak identification to the case of non-i.i.d. errors. 
  190.450 to 0.563. So the HHI in equations (2) and (3) is replaced with the corresponding 
fitted values from the semiparametric partially linear regression.
27
 
For comparison purposes, we first do not allow for the possibility of different 
regimes and separately estimate the price and occupancy rate equations by least squares. 
The results are reported in Table 7. Several of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant, particularly in the price 
equation. Regarding the property-specific characteristics, high-quality hotels charge, on 
average, 31.4% higher prices than low-quality ones, reflecting the higher costs associated 
with providing additional quality. These hotels report at the same time a 12.9% higher 
occupancy rate. Besides, medium and large hotels charge 5.6% lower prices than small 
hotels and exhibit an 8.5% lower occupancy rate. 
As in the preliminary analysis, clustered hotels seem to charge lower prices and 
exhibit higher occupancy rates than isolated hotels in the same town (base group in the 
regressions), although these effects are attenuated by the number of hotels in the cluster. 
Since we do not allow for two-regime periods, this result is probably only reflecting 
spatial competition and/or agglomeration effects.
28 Monopolists and isolated hotels 
                                                 
27 The estimation results presented in this section are very similar to those when using the lagged value of 
the market-level HHI as an alternative instrument for it (but we lose observations for one period). 
28 Recall that the spatial competition literature predicts a lower price among clustered (and homogeneous) 
hotels, relative to isolated properties, due to a price competition effect, and a higher occupancy rate due to a 
market share effect. The agglomeration literature predicts, in turn, a higher price and occupancy rate among 
clustered hotels because of a higher matching quality and matching probability effect. Testing for these 
effects is beyond the scope of the present study.  
  20without a cluster in town also face higher occupancy rates than isolated properties with a 
cluster in town, but do not report significant differences in prices. 
With respect to the market-specific variables, market concentration has a negative 
effect on prices but it does not significantly affect occupancy rates. A one standard 
deviation increase in the HHI (0.28) results in a 3.1% decrease in prices.
29 Prices are also 
positively correlated with the per capita income in the area. This is in line with the fact 
that wealthier locations usually have more businesses and places to visit, so we expect a 
higher number of visitors and higher prices. Hotels located in areas with higher wages 
and a higher value of land naturally charge higher prices because of the higher costs they 
face (but they also show lower occupancy rates). Additionally, the further away a hotel is 
from an urban area the higher the price it charges probably due to its higher market power 
in the vicinity of the area. A 10% increase in the distance to a MSA result in a 1.2% 
increase in prices. Curiously, population has a negative (although economically small) 
effect on both prices and occupancy rates. Finally, a higher number of gas stations in the 
area, which may approximate potential demand for hotel rooms, have a positive effect on 
occupancy rates but a negative impact on prices.
30
We now turn to the MLE results of the switching regression model which 
endogenously classifies prices and occupancy rates into two regimes. As noted above, we 
jointly model a price and occupancy rate equation under each regime. The results are 
                                                 
29 This result might seem counterintuitive but recall that for several oligopolistic competition models prices 
fall with market concentration (Sutton, 1991). 
30 Gas stations exist to serve both residents of and travelers passing through and visiting a market. As 
indicated by Chung and Kalnins (2001), a higher number of gas stations in a market might also indicate that 
the area is well located as an intermediate point from one major destination to another. 
  21presented in Table 8. Regime 1 is the potential collusive regime provided that hotels 
charge significantly higher prices than in regime 2 and face lower occupancy rates.
31 
Prices and occupancy rates also show a lower dispersion during regime 1. In Model 1, the 
mixing parameter h or probability of being in the suspected collusive regime is modeled 
as a constant while in Model 2 we allow this probability to vary depending on the relative 
location of the hotel within the town. In Model 3, we control for additional factors 
considered to affect the sustainability of tacit collusion. 
As can be seen, all three specifications provide very similar results regarding the 
impact of firm- and market-specific variables on prices and occupancy rates. It follows 
that when allowing for two regimes, the magnitude and direction of the effect of several 
of the control variables are not necessarily similar to those obtained under the least-
squares approach and may vary by regime.
32 For example, quality type has a higher 
positive impact during the suspected collusive regime. In Model 3, during the collusive 
period, high-quality hotels charge almost 48% higher prices than low-quality hotels and 
report a 13.4% higher occupancy rate; during the non-collusive period, the price and 
occupancy rate difference between high- and low-quality hotels is not significantly 
different. Medium and large lodging properties exhibit lower occupancy rates than small 
                                                 
31 This follows from the magnitude and significance of the constant terms under each regime. We also infer 
from these results that the switching regression model is not just distinguishing between high- and low-
demand seasons since in high seasons we expect both a high price and occupancy rate. Later we show that 
there is a lower probability of being in regime 1 (high prices, lower occupancy rates) during high seasons, 
i.e. second and third quarter of the year. 
32 Note that we allow for different coefficients of the control variables under each regime in order to have a 
more flexible model.  
  22properties during both regimes (as in the least-squares approach), but they only charge 
lower prices during non-collusive periods; during potential collusive periods they charge 
around 3% higher prices. Further, clustered hotels only seem to charge lower prices than 
isolated properties with a cluster in town during the non-collusive regime (60.6% lower 
prices) while during the suspected collusive regime they charge higher prices (11.4% 
higher prices) as well as monopolists and isolated properties without a cluster in town. In 
terms of occupancy rates, the results are less clear since clustered hotels report a higher 
occupancy rate during regime 1 and a lower occupancy rate during regime 2. Monopolists 
and isolated hotels without a cluster in town only report higher occupancy rates (as in the 
least-squares approach) during regime 2. Besides, market concentration only has a 
negative effect on prices during the non-collusive regime (as well as a negative effect on 
occupancy rates); during the collusive regime, a one standard deviation increase in the 
HHI results in a 5.5% increase in prices. Other market controls that show significant 
opposite effects across regimes include per capita income, wages, proximity to a MSA 
and number of gas stations.
33
Moving to the likelihood of being in regime 1, the potential collusive regime, in 
Model 1 we observe that the sample-wide probability is equal to 68.3%.
34 When we 
allow in Model 2 for the probability to vary with the geographical location of hotels, 
relative to their local competitors, we find that clustered hotels have a higher probability 
                                                 
33 Although examining the impact of different control variables on hotels’ prices and occupancy rates is not 
the main objective of the present study, these results reflect the importance of allowing for different 
regimes if we want to analyze the marginal effects of firm- and market-specific characteristics on hotels’ 
competitive behavior. 
34 In the regression, we estimate κ = 0.769 and h = exp(0.769) / (1+exp(0.769)) = 0.683. 
  23of engaging into tacit collusion than isolated properties with a cluster in town (base 
group). In particular, having a competitor in a radius of 0.2 miles increases the 
probability by more than twelve percentage points, from 64.8 to 76.9%. Similarly, 
monopolists, whom behavior should be close to perfect collusion, also show a higher 
likelihood of being in the potential collusive regime. The probability increases in this 
case by almost ten percentage points (to 74.7%). Isolated hotels without a cluster in town, 
on the contrary, show a lower probability of being in regime 1 than isolated properties 
with a cluster in town. The probability decreases by six percentage points (to 58.8%). 
If we further control for cluster size, seasonality and firm size, we still find that 
clustered hotels and monopolists have a higher probability of being in the potential 
collusive regime while isolated properties without a cluster have a lower probability 
(Model 3). Hotels with at least one competitor in a radius of 0.2 miles exhibit a 72.6% 
probability of being in the collusive regime, other things constant, while isolated hotels 
with a cluster in town only show a 60.8% probability. Monopolists show, in turn, a 72.8% 
probability of being in regime 1 while isolated hotels without a cluster in town show a 
55.1% probability. The direction of the coefficients of the other control variables is also 
consistent with the discussion of factors, other than agglomeration, considered to affect 
the sustainability of collusion. The likelihood of tacit collusion decreases with the 
number of hotels in the cluster provided that it is easier to collude among fewer firms; 
decreases during high seasons given that collusion is more difficult to maintain during 
high-demand periods (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986); and increases with hotel size 
provided that deviations from a collusive agreement are less profitable for large firms. 
Figure 4 illustrates the effects of these other variables by plotting the estimated 
  24probability of colluding, conditional on being clustered, as a function of the number of 
hotels in the cluster and by seasonality and hotel size.    
In sum, the results suggest that agglomeration facilitates tacit collusion. Clustered 
hotels show a higher probability of being in the potential collusive regime than isolated 
hotels in the same town. Our identification of the collusive regime is also consistent with 
other factors thought to affect the sustainability of colluding. Furthermore, monopolists, 
whom behavior is similar to perfect collusion, show as well a higher likelihood of being 
in the collusive regime while isolated properties without a cluster in town exhibit a lower 
probability. Monopolists are naturally expected to just follow one regime, equivalent to a 
perfectly collusive one, regardless of seasonal fluctuations in demand or any other 
factors. Based on the estimated probabilities of being in regime 1 (derived from Models 2 
and 3 for each hotel in our sample), we find that monopolistic firms are in fact the only 
group of hotels that are always predicted to follow the potential collusive regime. 
As a robustness check, we examine whether these findings persist under 
alternative cluster definitions. We consider a cluster radius of 0.1 miles and a cluster 
radius of 0.5 miles. The results are presented in Table 9 where regime 1 is the potential 
collusive regime with higher prices, lower occupancy rates and a lower dispersion in both 
market outcomes (relative to regime 2). Note that the estimated coefficients of the control 
variables under the two alternative cluster definitions are very similar to the ones 
obtained with a cluster radius of 0.2 miles (Model 3 in Table 8). If we either restrict the 
cluster radius to 0.1 miles or expand the cluster radius to 0.5 miles, we still observe that 
clustered properties have a higher probability of engaging into tacit collusion than 
isolated properties with a cluster in town. In the case of a cluster radius of 0.1 miles, 
  25having a nearby competitor increases the probability by about 17 percentage points, 
holding all else constant, while in the case of a cluster radius of 0.5 miles, the probability 
increases by about 26 percentage points. Monopolists again have a higher probability of 
being in the collusive regime while isolated properties without a cluster in town have a 
lower, but not significant, probability of being in regime 1. The likelihood of being in the 
identified collusive regime is also negatively related to cluster size and high-demand 
seasons and positively related to firm size. For comparison purposes, in Figure 5 we plot 
the probability of colluding, conditional on being clustered, as a function of cluster size 
for the different cluster definitions.  
 
6 Conclusions  
 
This paper has empirically examined if agglomeration facilitates tacit collusion in the 
lodging industry using a quarterly dataset of hotels that operated in rural areas across 
Texas between 2003 and 2005. Unlike previous studies that use some form of mixture 
modeling and focus on price behavior, we jointly model a price and occupancy rate 
equation under a switching regression model to endogenously identify a collusive and 
non-collusive regime. In the potential collusive regime, hotels are expected to charge 
higher prices and exhibit lower occupancy rates than in the non-collusive regime, and 
both prices and occupancy rates are expected to show a lower dispersion. We then 
analyze if agglomeration increases the probability of being in the collusive regime.  
The results indicate that clustered hotels have a higher probability of being in the 
potential collusive regime than isolated hotels with a cluster in town. In particular, hotels 
  26with a nearby competitor in a radius of 0.2 miles are about twelve percentage points more 
likely of being in the collusive regime than isolated properties in the same town. Our 
identification of a collusive regime is also consistent with other factors considered to 
affect the sustainability of collusion like cluster size, seasonality and firm size, and the 
results are robust to alternative cluster definitions. Further, monopolists, whom behavior 
should be similar to perfect collusion, also show a higher likelihood of being in the 
collusive regime. 
These findings support the hypothesis that agglomeration may facilitate tacit 
collusion by providing opportunities for frequent interaction among clustered hotels, 
increasing market transparency, and reducing monitoring costs if there is any collusive 
agreement. The inclusion of other variables thought to affect the sustainability of 
collusion cannot completely rule out any potential misspecification error in our 
identification strategy but reduces the possibility of alternative explanations for the 
results obtained. The nature of our dataset (i.e. quarterly data) prevents us from 
considering alternative identification strategies; for example, allowing for reversion 
periods during the collusive regime. Similarly, we take long-run decision variables like 
capacity, quality and geographic location as given due to the small number of 
entries/exits and change of affiliations in our sample. Future research should incorporate 
dynamic aspects into the analysis of agglomeration and tacit collusion.  
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  32Table 1: Distribution of markets by number of hotels 
 
# hotels in  # markets  % 
market       
1 1,027  37.1 
2 508  18.3 
3 380  13.7 
4 133  4.8 
5 204  7.4 
6 129  4.7 
7 79  2.9 
8 55  2.0 
9 68  2.5 
10 56  2.0 
More than 10  132  4.8 
    
Total 2,771  100.0 
 
 
  33Table 2: Distribution of hotels by size 
 
Size #  hotels  % 
Less than 25 rooms  268  30.8 
26 - 50 rooms  326  37.5 
51 - 75 rooms  171  19.7 
76 - 100 rooms  62  7.1 
More than 100 rooms  43  4.9 
    
Total 870  100.0 
Note: There are more than 845 observations because 23  
of the lodging properties changed their affiliation during  
the sample period.  
  34Table 3: Distribution of hotels by chain affiliation and quality type 
 
  Quality rating  % total 
Chain affiliation  Low  High  Total    
Best Western  0  78  78  9.0 
Holiday 0  39  39  4.5 
Days 1  35  36  4.1 
Comfort 0  30  30  3.4 
Super 8  1  29  30  3.4 
Econolodge 0  16  16  1.8 
Ramada 1  12  13  1.5 
Motel 6  12  0  12  1.4 
Best Value  1  10  11  1.3 
Other chains  8  29  37  4.3 
        
Total "Top 50+" chains  24  278  302  34.7 
Others 530  38  568  65.3 
Total 554  316  870  100.0 
% total  63.7  36.3  100.0    
Note: There are more than 845 observations because 23 of the lodging  
properties changed their affiliation during the sample period. Low and high  
quality correspond to one and two or more "diamonds", respectively, under 
AAA's rating. Holiday includes Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn Express 
while Comfort includes Comfort Inn and Comfort Suites. 
 
  35Table 4: Distribution of hotels by relative location, size and quality type 
 
  Clustered  Isolated, cluster  Monopolist  Isolated, no  Total 
        in town        cluster in town       
  # % # % # %  # % # % 
By size                       
Up to 25 rooms  57  18.8  62  27.9  56.0  55.5  93.0  38.3  268  30.8 
26  -  50  rooms  116 38.2 86 38.7  35.0 34.7  89.0  36.6  326  37.5 
51  -  75  rooms  74  24.3  46  20.7 8.0  7.9 43.0 17.7  171 19.7 
76 - 100 rooms  34  11.2  13  5.9  1.0  1.0  14.0  5.8  62  7.1 
More  than  100  rooms  23 7.6  15 6.8  1.0 1.0  4.0  1.7  43  4.9 
                  
By quality type                  
Low  157 51.6  132 59.5  91.0 90.1  174.0  71.6  554  63.7 
High  147  48.4  90  40.5  10.0  9.9 69.0 28.4  316 36.3 
                  
Total  304 100.0 222 100.0 101 100.0  243  100.0  870  100.0 
%  total  34.9   25.5   11.6   27.9    100.0   
Note: There are more than 845 observations because 23 of the lodging properties changed their affiliation during 
the sample period. A hotel is considered clustered if it has a competitor in a radius of 0.2 miles. Low and high quality 
correspond to one and two or more "diamonds", respectively, under AAA's rating. 
  36Table 5: ADR and occupancy rate by relative location 
 
  ADR Occupancy  rate 
Mean       
Clustered 52.8  51.3 
Isolated, cluster in town  57.6  49.8 
t-test 0.00  0.00 
    
Total sample  55.2  49.5 
Standard deviation       
Clustered 24.5  15.1 
Isolated, cluster in town  34.2  15.8 
sd-test 0.00  0.01 
    
Total sample  33.8  15.6 
Note: A hotel is considered clustered if it has a competitor in a radius  
of 0.2 miles. Mean comparison test is based on two sample t-test with 
unequal variances using Welch’s formula for degrees of freedom;  
Prob(|T|>|t|) reported. Equality of variance test based on Levene’s 
robust test; Pr > F reported. 
 
 
  37Table 6: Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis  
 
  Mean St.  dev.  Min  Max 
ADR  (US$)  55.2 33.8 17.5  524.2 
Occupancy  rate  0.50 0.16 0.02 0.98 
Firm variables           
Clustered  0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Isolated, cluster in town  0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Monopolist  0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Isolated, no cluster in town  0.27  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Number of nearby hotels  1.76  1.40  1.00  9.00 
Clustered  (0.1  miles)  0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Number of nearby hotels (0.1 miles)  1.38  0.79  1.00  6.00 
Clustered  (0.5  miles)  0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Number of nearby hotels (0.5 miles)  2.75  2.68  1.00  14.00 
Medium or large hotel  0.32  0.47  0.00  1.00 
High  quality  0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Best  Western  0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Best  Value  0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Comfort  0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Days  0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Econolodge  0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Holiday  0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Motel  6  0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Super  8  0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Ramada  0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Market variables      
HHI  0.34 0.28 0.06 1.00 
Population 26,960  18,617  370  82,055 
Per capita personal income (US$)  23,839  4,590  11,013  55,301 
Gas  stations  12 9 0  40 
Value of land per acre (US$)  1,689  1,243  150  5,785 
Weekly  wage  (US$)  208 42 93  480 
Distance to a MSA (miles)  69.2  33.4  22.4  252.0 
Central  Texas  0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Gulf  Coast  0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
High  Plains  0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Metroplex  0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Northwest  Texas  0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
South  Texas  0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Southeast  Texas  0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Upper East Texas  0.12  0.33  0.00  1.00 
Upper Rio Grande  0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00 
West  Texas  0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
# observations           9,148 
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Table 7: Least squares regressions of price (ADR) and occupancy rate 
 
  Log ADR  Log Occ 
  Coeff. Std.  err. Coeff. Std.  err. 
Constant -0.787  0.512  0.108  0.293 
Clustered -0.152  0.030  0.066  0.018 
Monopolist -0.035  0.029  0.091  0.021 
Isolated, no cluster in town  -0.016  0.021  0.048  0.015 
Log nearby hotels  0.088  0.028  -0.041  0.015 
Medium or large hotel  -0.056  0.011  -0.085  0.010 
High quality  0.314  0.019  0.129  0.014 
Best Western  0.041  0.018  0.208  0.014 
Best Value  -0.427  0.032  -0.102  0.032 
Comfort 0.176  0.019  0.219  0.018 
Days -0.114  0.019  0.070  0.017 
Econolodge -0.230  0.021  -0.128  0.024 
Holiday 0.260  0.019  0.324  0.015 
Motel 6  -0.082  0.022  0.380  0.015 
Super 8  -0.154  0.020  0.083  0.018 
Ramada -0.205  0.025  0.055  0.026 
HHI -0.136  0.060  -0.088  0.047 
Log population  -0.036  0.013  -0.031  0.009 
Log per capita income  0.241  0.043  -0.020  0.026 
Gas stations  -0.011  0.002  0.005  0.001 
Log value of land  0.135  0.015  -0.014  0.010 
Log wage   0.198  0.047  -0.085  0.032 
Log distance to MSA  0.123  0.017  -0.014  0.012 
Central Texas  0.169  0.034  -0.073  0.026 
High Plains  0.003  0.038  -0.047  0.031 
Metroplex 0.241  0.042  -0.035  0.029 
Northwest Texas  -0.026  0.036  -0.033  0.028 
South Texas  0.275  0.034  0.030  0.026 
Southeast Texas  0.167  0.039  -0.005  0.029 
Upper East Texas  0.253  0.032  -0.028  0.026 
Upper Rio Grande  0.381  0.056  0.067  0.041 
West Texas  0.128  0.041  0.003  0.031 
# observations    9,148    9,148 
R-squared     0.272     0.204 
Note: White robust standard errors reported, clustered on area-time period.  
All models include time-period dummies. 
 
 Table 8: Switching regression model of price (ADR) and occupancy rate 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Log ADR  Log Occ  Log ADR  Log Occ  Log ADR  Log Occ 
  Coeff. Std.  err. Coeff. Std.  err. Coeff. Std.  err. Coeff. Std.  err. Coeff. Std.  err. Coeff. Std.  err. 
Regime 1                                     
Constant  2.979 0.255  -0.646 0.230  3.033 0.240  -0.575 0.230  2.795 0.240  -0.752 0.245 
Clustered  0.119 0.019  0.070 0.020  0.120 0.024  0.059 0.023  0.114 0.026  0.053 0.021 
Monopolist  0.100 0.018  0.017 0.018  0.100 0.022  0.007 0.021  0.090 0.023  0.000 0.020 
Isolated, no cluster in town  0.078  0.013  0.005  0.013  0.072  0.016  0.008  0.015  0.072  0.017  0.007  0.015 
Log  nearby  hotels  -0.013 0.016  -0.052 0.018  -0.009 0.021  -0.050 0.019  -0.018 0.021  -0.046 0.017 
Medium or large hotel  0.021  0.010  -0.080  0.011  0.017  0.012  -0.078  0.011  0.030  0.013  -0.102  0.010 
High  quality  0.462 0.017  0.113 0.016  0.468 0.020  0.115 0.018  0.479 0.019  0.134 0.015 
HHI  0.206 0.036  -0.023 0.037  0.215 0.044  -0.020 0.047  0.196 0.052  -0.027 0.040 
Log  population  -0.067 0.008  -0.013 0.008  -0.069 0.010  -0.014 0.009  -0.066 0.010  -0.015 0.008 
Log per capita income  -0.062  0.024  -0.016  0.023  -0.059  0.025  -0.020  0.024  -0.036  0.028  -0.010  0.024 
Gas  stations  0.003 0.001  0.002 0.001  0.003 0.001  0.002 0.001  0.003 0.001  0.002 0.001 
Log value of land  0.072  0.009  0.005  0.010  0.074 0.012  0.003 0.011  0.079 0.012  0.007 0.010 
Log wage   0.133  0.030  0.017  0.030  0.119  0.034  0.017  0.033  0.103  0.036  0.012  0.028 
Log distance to MSA  0.070  0.013  -0.010  0.013  0.068  0.015  -0.013  0.014  0.078  0.015  0.010  0.014 
                   (Cont.) 
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  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Log ADR  Log Occ  Log ADR  Log Occ  Log ADR  Log Occ 
  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err. 
Regime 2                                     
Constant  -0.196  0.978 -1.698  0.898 -0.183  1.140 -1.845  1.354 -0.453  1.042 -1.294  1.066 
Clustered  -0.538  0.068 -0.110  0.068 -0.490  0.072 -0.177  0.064 -0.606  0.078 -0.140  0.069 
Monopolist  -0.031  0.050 0.133  0.046 0.032  0.058 0.118  0.045 0.013  0.057 0.146  0.048 
Isolated, no cluster in town  -0.144  0.034  0.105  0.033  -0.168  0.035  0.111  0.031  -0.185  0.038  0.117  0.034 
Log  nearby  hotels  0.289  0.057 0.073  0.056 0.289  0.059 0.103  0.053 0.365  0.066 0.096  0.057 
Medium or large hotel  -0.252  0.032  -0.089  0.031  -0.261  0.032  -0.091  0.030  -0.144  0.039  -0.181  0.039 
High  quality  0.080  0.039 0.073  0.041 0.074  0.043 0.059  0.040 0.034  0.042 0.022  0.041 
HHI  -0.354  0.155 -0.732  0.151 -0.325  0.160 -0.802  0.147 -0.508  0.160 -0.622  0.151 
Log  population  -0.031  0.019 -0.058  0.018 -0.038  0.020 -0.058  0.018 -0.061  0.020 -0.054  0.022 
Log per capita income  0.480  0.097  0.273  0.099  0.465  0.105  0.306  0.131  0.605  0.102  0.236  0.108 
Gas  stations  -0.015  0.003 -0.005  0.003 -0.015  0.003 -0.007  0.003 -0.020  0.003 -0.004  0.003 
Log value of land  0.182  0.031  -0.023  0.029  0.195  0.033  -0.020  0.030  0.206  0.031  -0.032  0.030 
Log wage   -0.225  0.077  -0.240  0.070  -0.197  0.079  -0.270  0.070  -0.302  0.078  -0.210  0.073 
Log distance to MSA  0.003  0.049  0.013  0.043  -0.017  0.047  0.015  0.041  -0.093  0.051  -0.039  0.045 




  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
     Coeff.  Std.  err.      Coeff.  Std. err.      Coeff.  Std. err. 
Probability of Regime 1                                     
Constant      0.769  0.042     0.611  0.073     0.440  0.088 
Clustered             0.594  0.100      0.751  0.199 
Monopolist             0.474  0.135      0.543  0.132 
Isolated, no cluster in town              -0.253  0.107      -0.235  0.103 
Log  nearby  hotels                 -0.314  0.159 
High  season                 -0.156  0.078 
Medium or large hotel                      1.354  0.112 
σε
1     0.229  0.003     0.230  0.003     0.230  0.004 
σu
1     0.233  0.003     0.234  0.004     0.238  0.003 
ρ
1     0.366  0.006     0.372  0.005     0.376  0.005 
σε
2     0.429  0.009     0.431  0.010     0.441  0.009 
σu
2     0.438  0.008     0.437  0.007     0.440  0.008 
ρ
2       0.342  0.010        0.343  0.011        0.310  0.012 
#  observations        9,148       9,148       9,148 
Log likelihood           -5,483.5           -5,419.4           -5,299.3 
Note: All models include major top-chain, regional and time-period dummies. The top chains are Best Western, Best Value, Comfort, Days, Econolodge,  
Holiday, Motel 6, Super 8, and Ramada. A hotel is considered clustered if it has a nearby competitor in a radius of 0.2 miles. Variance of correlation  






 Table 9: Switching regression model of price (ADR) and occupancy rate, alternative 
cluster definitions 
 
  Cluster radius = 0.1 miles  Cluster radius = 0.5 miles 
  Log ADR  Log Occ  Log ADR  Log Occ 
  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff. Std.  err. Coeff. Std.  err. 
Regime 1                         
Constant 3.007  0.232  -0.774  0.235  2.500  0.244  -0.870  0.238 
Clustered  0.055  0.027 0.065  0.026 0.114  0.021 0.024  0.019 
Monopolist 0.073  0.020  -0.012  0.019  0.055  0.023  -0.014  0.021 
Isolated, no cluster in town  0.049  0.014  -0.009  0.013  0.028  0.019  -0.009  0.018 
Log  nearby  hotels  0.036  0.029 -0.043  0.028 -0.034  0.014 -0.044  0.013 
Medium or large hotel  0.029  0.012  -0.109  0.012  0.038  0.012  -0.098  0.012 
High  quality  0.482  0.017 0.134  0.017 0.485  0.018 0.137  0.017 
HHI 0.199  0.038  0.002  0.039  0.229  0.054  -0.034  0.050 
Log  population  -0.070  0.009 -0.012  0.009 -0.065  0.010 -0.022  0.010 
Log per capita income  -0.048  0.024  -0.004  0.024  -0.014  0.027  0.004  0.025 
Gas  stations  0.003  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.002  0.001 
Log value of land  0.080  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.082  0.012  0.008  0.011 
Log wage   0.096  0.032  -0.005  0.032  0.107  0.037  0.025  0.031 
Log distance to MSA  0.074  0.013  0.004  0.014  0.080  0.014  0.009  0.013 
Regime 2                         
Constant  -0.302  1.110 -1.298  1.137 -0.472  1.285 -0.991  1.110 
Clustered  -0.498  0.111 -0.319  0.104 -0.354  0.060 -0.202  0.050 
Monopolist  -0.004  0.052 0.120  0.047 0.038  0.056 0.158  0.047 
Isolated, no cluster in town  -0.228  0.036  0.082  0.031  -0.117  0.042  0.140  0.036 
Log  nearby  hotels  0.168  0.112 0.283  0.106 0.190  0.037 0.084  0.031 
Medium or large hotel  -0.122  0.039  -0.168  0.038  -0.196  0.041  -0.183  0.037 
High  quality  0.037  0.040 0.003  0.040 0.088  0.044 0.030  0.040 
HHI  -0.531  0.165 -0.605  0.154 -0.306  0.173 -0.768  0.158 
Log  population  -0.074  0.019 -0.054  0.019 -0.042  0.021 -0.033  0.020 
Log per capita income  0.612  0.110  0.230  0.118  0.553  0.121  0.204  0.115 
Gas  stations  -0.020  0.004 -0.004  0.003 -0.015  0.003 -0.006  0.003 
Log value of land  0.183  0.032  -0.035  0.030  0.195  0.035  -0.036  0.031 
Log wage   -0.253  0.078  -0.197  0.071  -0.306  0.080  -0.223  0.069 
Log distance to MSA  -0.122  0.052  -0.029  0.046  -0.036  0.055  -0.041  0.042 
             (Cont.) 
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  Cluster radius = 0.1 miles  Cluster radius = 0.5 miles 
        Coeff.  Std. err.        Coeff.  Std. err. 
Probability of Regime 1                         
Constant     0.409  0.075      0.034  0.087 
Clustered     1.282  0.301      1.530  0.157 
Monopolist     0.632  0.130      0.838  0.136 
Isolated, no cluster in town      -0.044  0.091      -0.022  0.122 
Log nearby hotels      -0.692  0.324      -0.456  0.089 
High season      -0.165  0.070      -0.150  0.072 
Medium or large hotel      1.367  0.110      1.333  0.108 
σε
1    0.232  0.003     0.232  0.003 
σu
1    0.241  0.003     0.237  0.003 
ρ
1    0.373  0.006     0.382  0.005 
σε
2    0.431  0.010     0.451  0.010 
σu
2    0.443  0.007     0.441  0.007 
ρ
2       0.314  0.011        0.278  0.013 
# observations           9,148           9,148 
Log likelihood           -5,280.0           -5,266.3 
Note: All models include major top-chain, regional and time-period dummies. The top chains are Best Western,  
Best Value, Comfort, Days, Econolodge, Holiday, Motel 6, Super 8, and Ramada. Variance of correlation  
coefficient obtained using the delta method. 
 
















































Note: Amounts expressed in 1982-84 CPI-adjusted dollars. 
Source: www.travel.state.tx.us/asp/customreports.aspx
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  48Figure 5: Probability of colluding, conditional on being clustered,  


































# additional  hotels in cluster
cluster radius = 0.2 miles cluster radius = 0.1 miles cluster radius = 0.5 miles
 
 
Note: Probabilities based on a small hotel and low season. 
  49Table A.1: Texas Hotel Performance Factbook – Description of variables 
 
Room  counts  Are checked annually in chain directories and the Texas American 
Automobile Association (AAA) tour book. These properties account for 
approximately 80% of the state revenues. Properties are also checked by 
calling census and physical inspection by Source Strategies Inc. (SSI). 
For independent properties too small to be listed, the room counts 
reported to the Texas state government are used (unless they appear 
unreasonable). As a result, “Chains” room counts are very close to 
actual, while independent room counts could be slightly overstated. 
     
Average Daily Rates (ADR)  Obtained from financial reports, appraisers, private SSI surveys, chain 
and AAA directories, and another reliable industry database. 
     
Occupancy  rate  Is calculated from room nights sold and room nights available. All 
occupancy figures represent fully-weighted averages. Room nights sold 
are obtained by dividing gross room revenues reported to the State of 
Texas Comptroller by ADR. Room nights available are calculated from 
room counts times the number of days in the period. 
     
“Chains”  Are defined as one of the "Top 50+" brands determined and tracked by 
SSI. These brands may vary across time. Our sample includes, among 
others, Americas Best Value, Best Western, Budget Host, Comfort, 
Days, Econo Lodge, Hampton, Holiday, La Quinta, Motel 6, Ramada, 
and Super 8. 
     
Note: According to SSI, on an overall basis the changes in ADR reported are within a few tenths of one-
percent of Smith Travel's “Lodging Outlook”. Smith Travel Research (STR) is a private research firm that 
gets full financial reports of hotel/motel properties, accounting for 80% of the market, but it only publishes 
aggregate results. 
 
  50Table A.2: AAA Diamond rating 
 
One Diamond  These establishments typically appeal to the budget-minded traveler. 
   They provide essential, no-frills accommodations. They meet the basic 
   requirements pertaining to comfort, cleanliness, and hospitality. 
     
Two Diamond  These establishments appeal to the traveler seeking more than the basic 
   accommodations. There are modest enhancements to the overall 
   physical attributes, design elements, and amenities of the facility 
   typically at a moderate price. 
     
Three Diamond  These establishments appeal to the traveler with comprehensive needs. 
   Properties are multifaceted with a distinguished style, including 
   marked upgrades in the quality of physical attributes, amenities, 
   and level of comfort provided. 
     
Four Diamond  These establishments are upscale in all areas. Accommodations are 
   progressively more refined and stylish. The physical attributes reflect 
   an obvious enhanced level of quality throughout. The fundamental 
   hallmarks at this level include an extensive array of amenities combined 
   with a high degree of hospitality, service, and attention to detail. 
     
   Source: www.aaa-texas.com.   
 
 
  51Table A.3: Sources of information consulted to construct market controls 
 
Source Variable 
Texas State Data Center and Office of   Population 
the State Demographer  Annual population at the county level. 
Texas Population Estimates Program    
http://txsdc.utsa.edu/tpepp/txpopest.php   
     
Bureau of Economic Analysis  Per capita income 
http://bea.gov/bea/regional/reis Annual per capita personal income at the 
   county level. 
     
Google Maps  Gas stations 
www.google.com Number of gas stations at each location. 
     
Real State Center at Texas A&M University  Value of land 
www.recenter.tamu.edu/data/agp Median per-acre value of rural land 
   per year at the land market area. 
     
Bureau of Labor Statistics  Wage 
www.bls.gov/data/home.htm Average weekly wage on leisure and  
  hospitality per quarter at the county level. 
     
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts  Distance to MSA 
Texas Mileage Guide  Mileage between location and nearest MSA. 
www.window.state.tx.us/comptrol/texastra.html   
     
MapQuest (for missing locations)    
www.mapquest.com   
    
Texas Tourism Travel Industry website  Regional dummies based on Uniform State 
Economic Impact of Travel 2005  Service Regions. 
www.travel.state.tx.us/EconomicImpact.aspx   
     
  52Table A.4: Locations included in the study by region 
 
Regions Locations 
Central Texas  Blanco, Brenham, Buchanan Dam, Buffalo, Burnet, Cameron, Centerville, 
(42 locations)  Chappell Hill, Clifton, Fairfield, Flatonia, Giddings, Goldthwaite, Granite 
   Shoals, Groesbeck, Hamilton, Hico, Hillsboro, Hilltop Lakes, Horseshoe Bay, 
   Iredell, Jewett, Johnson City, Kingsland, Kopperl, La Grange, Laguna Park, 
   Lake Whitney, Llano, Madisonville, Marble Falls, Marlin, Meridian, Mexia, 
   Navasota, Rockdale, Round Top, San Saba, Schulenburg, Streetman, 
   Tow, Whitney. 
Gulf Coast  Bay City, Columbus, Eagle Lake, El Campo, Frelsburg, Huntsville, Matagorda, 
(12)  Midfield, Palacios, Pierce, Weimar, Wharton. 
High Plains  Borger, Brownfield, Canadian, Childress, Clarendon, Dalhart, Denver City, 
(28)  Dimmit, Dumas, Floydada, Friona, Hereford, Levelland, Littlefield, Memphis, 
   Muleshoe, Pampa, Perryton, Plainview, Post, Shamrock, Spearman, Stratford, 
   Tulia, Vega, Wellington, Wheeler, Wildorado. 
Metroplex  Bluff Dale, Bonham, Corsicana, Dublin, Gainesville, Glen Rose, Graford, 
(12)  Granbury, Mineral Wells, Mingus, Stephenville, Strawn. 
Northwest Texas  Albany, Aspermont, Ballinger, Bowie, Breckenridge, Brownwood, Cisco, 
(28)  Coleman, Colorado City, Comanche, De Leon, Early, Eastland, Graham, 
   Haskell, Jacksboro, Knox City, Nocona, Olney, Quanah, Ranger, Santa Anna, 
   Seymour, Snyder, Stamford, Sweetwater, Valera, Vernon. 
South Texas  Alice, Beeville, Brackettville, Camp Wood, Carrizo Springs, Concan, Cotulla, 
(48)  Crystal City, Cuero, Del Rio, Dilley, Eagle Pass, Edna, Escobares, Falfurrias, 
   Fredericksburg, Freer, George West, Gonzales, Hallettsville, Hebbronville, 
   Hunt, Ingram, Kenedy, Kerrville, Kingsville, Leakey, Mountain Home, Orange 
   Grove, Pearsall, Port Mansfield, Premont, Raymondville, Refugio, Rio Frio, 
   Rio Grande City, Riviera, Rocksprings, Roma, Sarita, Shiner, Smiley, Stonewall, 
   Three Rivers, Utopia, Uvalde, Yoakum, Zapata. 
Southeast Texas  Broaddus, Brookeland, Center, Crockett, Diboll, Etoile, Hemphill, Jasper, 
(20)  Kirbyville, Livingston, Lufkin, Milam, Nacogdoches, Newton, Onalaska, 
   Sam Rayburn, San Augustine, Seven Oaks, Trinity, Woodville. 
Upper East Texas  Alba, Athens, Atlanta, Canton, Carthage, Clarksville, Emory, Frankston, 
(28)  Grand Saline, Gun Barrel City, Hawkins, Hughes Springs, Jacksonville, 
   Jefferson, Malakoff, Marshall, Mineola, Mount Pleasant, Mount Vernon, 
   Palestine, Paris, Queen City, Quitman, Rusk, Scroggins, Sulphur Springs, 
   Van, Wills Point. 
Upper Rio Grande  Alpine, Big Bend National Park, Fort Davis, Fort Hancock, Lajitas, Marathon,  
(11)  Marfa, Presidio, Shafter, Terlingua, Van Horn. 
West Texas  Andrews, Big lake, Big Spring, Brady, Crane, Eden, Fort Stockton, Iraan,  
(21)  Junction, Kermit, Lamesa, Mason, Menard, Monahans, Ozona, 
   Paint Rock, Pecos, Rankin, Sanderson, Seminole, Sonora. 
Note: Regions based on Uniform State Service Regions. 
Source: www.travel.state.tx.us/EconomicImpact.aspx. 
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